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No. 6890.

In Bank.

May

1958.]

EDWARD J. VOLF et al., Respondents, v. THE OCEAN
ACCIDENT AND GUARAN'l'EE COHPORATION,
L'l'D. (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Insurance-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity InsuranceInjury to Property.--\Vhere the insured contractor, under a
comprehensive liability policy excluding injury to "property
in the care, custody or control of the insured," to a product
"manufactured, sold, handled or distributed . . . by the named
insured" and to "work completed by . . . the named insured,"
constructed a stucco house but, because of the use of defective
cement, cracks appeared in the stucco while the insured was
constructing the house and before the owner took possession,
and the insured put a new stucco exterior over the old at additional cost, the loss to the insured was excluded and it was
immaterial whether or not the owner of the building became
the owner of the stucco.
[2] !d.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity Insurance-Injury
to Property.-A comprehensive liability policy excluding
coverage to property in the care, custody or control of the
insured contractor and work completed by him was not reasonably susceptible of the interpretation that the exclusion clauses
did not preclude recovery of the loss to the insured by reason
of his placing a new stucco exterior over the old to replace
defective stucco work, and the wife's testimony that they
wanted "full coverage as far as materials and workmanship"
were concerned and that they wanted "the most coverage for
as much, what we could afford" did not support that interpretation where there was no discussion of particular risks or exclusions and the insured and his wife accepted the policy and
renewed it the following year without objection.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Calaveras County. J. A. Smith, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Action on a comprehensive liability insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed with directions.
Alexander, Bacon & Mnndhenk, William F. Stone, Paul A.
Unsworth, and Honey, Mayall & Hurley for .Appellant.
Gordon ,J. Aulik for Respondents.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, §§ 506, 509 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Insurance, § 1225 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Insurance,§ 189.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Edward J.
a
conconstructed a stucco house in San Andreas for A. P.
Hoover. A stucco exterior finish for a house consists of three
coats: a "scratch" coat, which is a mixture of sand, cement
and water applied
inch to
inch thick; a "brown" coat,
which is a similar mixture of the same thickness; and a ''color''
or "finish"
which is like a paint wash applied with a
trowel about
thick. The ''scratch'' coat went on without incident. The "brown" coat would not stick to the
"scratch" coat so Volf returned the mixture to the Neilsen
Company for replacement. He mixed the new ingredients in
the proper proportions and applied the "brown" coat. The
mixture did not meet Volf's expectations but he assumed that
it would be all right. ~'\fter applying the "brown" coat, he
applied the finish or "color" coat. Shortly before the buildwas completed and possession taken by Hoover, cracks appeared in the exterior stucco of the building and Hoover
complained. Hoover and Volf then agreed that if the cracks
did not get worse Hoover would accept the building and Volf
would fill in and paint over the cracks if necessary. When the
rain came, the cracks became worse and Hoover called in the
State Contracting Board. Tasts showed that the stucco was
of the right mixture but below compressive strength and that
the cracking occurred in the "scratch" and "brown" coats.
The board decided in favor of Hoover and Volf put a new
stucco exterior over the old at an additional cost to him of
$1,309.15.
Defendant had issued to plaintiffs a comprehensive liability
insurance policy that contained, among other provisions, the
following clause:" CovERAGE D-PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
-ExcEPT AuTOMOBILE. To pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of injury to or destruction of property,
including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident.'' The
policy also contained certain exclusions. The pertinent part
of "Exclusion (g)" provided that the policy did not apply
under coverage "D" to injury to or destruction of " ( 3) .
property in the care, custody or control of the insured, or
( 4) any goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or
distributed . . . by the named insured, or work completed
by . . . the named insured, out of which the accident
arises.
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover the cost of the new
stucco exterior. The trial court entered judgment for plaine
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tiffs, and defendant insurance company
The only issue
involved is the coverage afforded by the policy.
[1] We agree with defendant that the injury was excluded
under ''Exclusion
'' of the policy, even if it is assumed
that it was otherwise included under coverage D. Since the
defective cement was used and the cracks appeared in the
stucco while V olf was constructing the house and before
Hoover took possession, the loss was occasioned by ''injury to
. . . property in the care, custody or control of the insured''
and is therefore excluded under Exclusion
(3). The injury is also excluded under Exclusion
( 4), for it was to a
product "manufactured, sold, handled or distributed . . . by
the named insured'' as well as to ''work completed by . . .
the named insured.''
Ha1tenstein v. Saint Paul-Merc1try Indern. Co., 242 Minn.
354 [65 N.W.2d 122, 125], and Heyward v. Arner·ican Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 129 F.Supp. 4, 8, invoked by plaintiffs, actually support defendant. In the Hauenstein case the
plaintiffs were distributors of a certain type of plaster. They
were insured by defendant for property damage under a clause
similar to coverage D in the instant policy, which was subject
to an exclusion identical to the products exclusion in Exclusion (g) (4). The plaintiffs sold the plaster to a contractor
who used it on a construction job. After application the
plaster shrank and cracked, and the contractor had to remove
it and replaster the walls and ceilings. The contractor sought
recovery from the plaintiffs for breach of warranty. Plaintiffs
then sought a declaratory judgment against the defendant
casualty company. They contended that the injury to the
plaster itself was not excluded on the grounds that after its
application it ceased to be goods or products, and by virtue
of the law of accession became a part of the realty. The court
rejected this contention, stating: "The law of accession is
important in controversies where the distinction between personalty and realty is vital, but it has no justifiable use as
a vehicle for importing ambiguity into the language of an
insurance contract where none otherwise exists . . . . Clearly
the exclusionary clause herein is applicable to plaster as a
product handled by plaintiffs without any limitation as to its
changed condition by its regular and ordinary use.'' The
court then found that aside from any injury to the plaster
itself the building was damaged by its application because
the plaster had to be removed so that the walls and ceilings
could be replastered. In the instant case, however, the stucco
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to be rcmovc•d and there is no evideuec and no
that the house was
reason of the
of the defective stucco.
In holding that an exclusion similar to Exclusion (g) in
the instant policy had no application to personal injury the
court in II cyward v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa.,
st~pra, stated: ''This Exclusion means that the policy will not
the insured if he has to repair or replace some product
or work which proved defective and caused an accident. The
Exclusion has no reference to liability for damage to other
property or personal injtlry arising out of such accident."
(129 F.Supp. at p. 8.) In the instant case the plaintiffs seek
protedion for the very thing that is specifically excluded by
Exclusion (g), i.e., the cost to the plaintiffs of replacing the
stucco that proved to be defective. So far as Exclusions (g)
(3) and (g) (4) are concerned it is immaterial whether or
not Hoover became the owner of the stucco.
[2] Plaintiffs contend that the extrinsic evidence supports
the interpretation that Exclusion (g) does not preclude recovery of the loss here involved. Mrs. Vol£ testified that
they stated that they wanted "full coverage as far as materials
and workmanship" were concerned and made other similar
statements. There was no discussion of particular risks. Mrs.
Vol£ also testified that they wanted "the most coverage for as
much, what we could afford,'' and that cost was an item with
respect to the purchase of insurance. She further testified that
they stated that they wanted full coverage "like Lodato," a
competitor, and that defendant's agent showed her I1odato 's
policy and "we were equally covered." When questioned
about the particular loss involved here, i.e., a situation where
plaintiffs had done a job and had to replace it, lVIrs. V olf
testified that there was no reference to such a situation "because we never had the need of it. vV e didn't think anything
like that would come up." 'rhere was no discussion of the particular exclusions, but plaintiffs aecepted the policy and renewed it the following year without objection. Exclusion (g),
especially Exclusion (g) (4) relating to work completed by
the named insured, is not reasonably susceptible of the interpretation contended for by plaintiffs, and the extrinsic evidence does not support their position. To read the policy to
cover the loss here involved would require that Exclusion (g)
be omitted from the policy, but the evidence does not show,
nor do plaintiffs claim, that they are entitled to a reformation
of the policy omitting Exclusion (g).
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The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of defendant.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CAHTER, J.-I dissent.
It is my considered opinion that there is sufiicient evidence
to support the findings and judgment of the trial court. That
court found that the cement used to make the "scratch" and
"brown" layers of the stucco application was defective and
caused it to disintegrate. It also determined that the oral and
documentary evidence offered to interpret the insurance contract implied that the contract covered the loss.
In reversing the judgment of the trial court the majority
holds that the damage was within exclusion (g) of the policy
for two reasons :
(1) The cracks in the stucco first appeared before Mr.
Hoover took possession of the house which was then ''property
in the care, custody, or control of the insured.''
(2) The damage was to a product "manufactured, sold,
handled or distributed . . . by the named insured'' and
''work completed by or for the named insured.''
The holding of the majority is highly technical and is not
supported by either the facts or law.
Although the stucco was slightly cracked before Mr. Hoover
took over the house, he and Volf agreed that the damage was
not so serious as to require another stucco application. Only
a bit of paint was needed to repair the damage. Only after
Mr. Hoover moved into the house did rainfall make the disintegration bad enough to require a new application of stucco.
Therefore the damage which made V olf liable for the new
application occurred while Mr. Hoover resided in the house.
Had the rainfall not caused this additional disintegration,
Volf would not have been liable for the ('ost of a stucco application. According to the majority's interpretation, exclusion
(g) encompasses any flaws in a completed building which
later becomes so aggravated as to require repair. It would
also imlude damage to other parts of the same building which
are affected by the original flaw. This is hardly consistent
with the observation of the writer of the majority opinion
that '' . . . it must not he forgotten that the primary funetion
of insnrauee is to insure." (Boll7.n(Jer v. National Fire Ins.

Co., 25 Cal.2d 399, 403 1154 P.2d 399] .)
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The majority also relies on exclusion (g) (4) which excludes
injury to or destruction of '' . . . any goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed or premises alienated
by the named insured, or work completed by or for the named
insured, md of which the acciclent arises . . . . " (Emphasis
added.)
Preliminarily it must be said that the emphasized phrase
modifies the entire subsection and not only ''or work completed by or for the named insured. . . . '' If it were meant
to relate only to the latter phrase the comma would properly
be omitted.
The trial court found that the accident arose from the cement used in the first stucco application. 'fhis exclusion may
be construed to avoid liability for the cement itself, although
its identity disappeared when it was mixed with other materials to make stucco. 'l'he majority has ignored the phrase
''out of which the accident arises'' which is the key to understanding the holding of the trial court. l\fy disagreement with
the majority lies here. I have four reasons for this interpretation:
( 1) 'f he clear intent of V olf and defendant's agent was to
provide ''full coverage as far as materials and workmanship''
were concerned for a building contractor. Other statements
similar in implication to the quoted phrase were made by
V olf and his wife in their negotiations with the agent. The
latent defects involved in this case are typical construction
problems. Vol£ asked for a form of complete protection and
relied on defendant to provide it. It is hardly possible to
enumerate the multitude of particular incidents which may
arise out of a business so complex as that of a building contractor. What was not discussed by V olf and the agent does
not imply that those things were not meant to be covered.
Vol£ asked for full coverage "like Lodato." This implies that
he thought Lodato was ''fully covered.'' The agent showed
V olf Lodato's policy and said V olf was ''equally covered.''
Vol£ 's reasonable interpretation of this was that both he and
Lodato were fully covered. This oral evidence is important
in determining the meaning of the language used in the contract.
(2) Under coverage "D" Vol£ was protected against "Products Hazard.'' The contract defines this as : ''. . . the handling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty
of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the named insured, other than equipment rented

Vot.F v. OcEAN Ace. & GuAR. CoRP.
[50 C.2d 373; 325 P.2d 987]

879

to or located for use of others but not sold, if the accident
occurs after the insured has relinquished possession thereof
to others and away from premises owned, rented or controlled
by the insured or on premises for which the classification
stated in the company's manual excludes any part of the foregoing. . . . "
Note that this paragraph includes coverage for " . . . the
existence of any condition in . . . goods or products manufactur·ed, sold, handled or d·istributed by the named insured. . . . '' The majority cites this language of exclusion
D : '' 'manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the
named insured' " as taking a thing out of the policy. If this
is correct, products hazard coverage as defined in the policy
is removed completely by the very same words in the exception! By giving meaning to the phrase ''out of which the
accident occurred" this anomaly would be avoided. It should
not be assumed the company, in bad faith, meant the definition of "products hazard" to be meaningless.
(3) The meaning of the phrase "out of which the accident
arises'' is made clearer by the fact that the person buying
and using a defective product may recover its value from the
seller. In this case Volf can recover the value of the defective
cement from the Nielsen Company. This implies that the
phrase in question applies only to the cement in this case, not
to the other ingredients of the stucco.
( 4) "An insurance policy is to be construed most favorably
to the insured, in such manner as to provide full coverage of
the indicated risk rather than to narrow the protection. (Olson
v. Standard MaTine Ins. Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 130, 135 [240
P.2d 379]; MilleT v. United Ins. Co., 113 Cal.App.2d 493, 497
[248 P.2d 113]; Pendell v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 95 Cal.
App.2d 766, 769 [214 P.2d 392] ; Fageol Truck & Coach Co.
v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal.2d 748, 751 [117 P.2d 669] .) The
courts will not sanction a construction of the insurer's language that will defeat the very purpose or object of the insurance. (MilleT v. United Ins. Co., supm, at p. 497; NaTveT v.
CalifoTnia State Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 176, 180 [294 P. 393,
71 A.L.R. 137 4].) . . . Normally a businessman who takes
'comprehensive' insurance with express coverage of 'products
property damage' would expect his ordinary transactions to
be covered. If the insurer would create an exception to the
general import of the principal coverage clauses, the burden
rests upon it to phrase that exception in clear and unmistakable language. (Pendell v. Westland Life Ins. Co., supm, at
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p. 770.) If this is not done any ambiguity or mwertainty is
resolved in favor of the policyholder. Indeed an exception
must be couched in terms whieh are dear to the ordinary
mind (Pendell v. TFestlawl Life Ins. Co., supra, at p. 770)
or any doubts as to the meaning will be resolved against the
insuret·." (Ritchie v. Anehol' Casualty Co., 13;) Cal.App.2d
245, 257-258 [28G P.2d lOOOJ.) ln view of the foregoing rule
defeudant should uot be permitted to exdude the very type
of coverage desired by plaintiffs by an exclusionary dause
worded ambiguously and not called to their attention.
I think Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indern. Co., 242
Minn. 354 [G5 N.W.2d 122], supports plaintiff. rrhe eourt
held the plaster sold by the plaintiff was the element eausing
the damage in that case. rrhe court held that plaintiff eould
not recover for damage to the plaster itself, but it could
recover for damage to the building. It is an inconsequential
distinction that the plaster had to be removed in the Hauenstein case but the damaged stucco in this case was merely
covered over. 'l'he crux is that beeause of the damage the
building's market value decreased. (Id., p. 125.) "No one
can reasonably contend that the application of a useless
plaster, which has to be removed before the walls can be
properly replastered, does not lower the market value of a
building. . . . " (I d.) The court held a proper measure of
damages to be the cost of removing the defective plaster and
restoring the building to its former condition. I interpret
this to mean restoration vvith proper plastering.
It can be argued that the Hauenstein case is distinguishable
because the building damaged was not built by the insured.
A company publication of the National Underwriters Company,* the "F. C. & S. Bulletins," dated August, 1955, entitled ''Products Liability Insurance,'' interprets the exclusion here scrutinized. This publication is written for sellers
of insurance. After diseussing the Hauenstein case it says:
''A common source of argument-not answered by any
decisions at present-is liability arising out of a piece of
equipment with several distinct parts, all sold or installed by
the same insured at the same time. Should a defect in one
part or a faulty installation of that part damage the balanee
of the equipment, it is not clear whether the exelusion would
deuy eoverage for damage to the entire pieee of equipment
or only to the portion eausing the damage.''
*A profit-oriented insurance enterprise.
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Thus it is obvious that underwriters themselves are not
certain what the paragraph in issue means. The policy to
interpret ambiguous clauses in insurance contracts in favor
of the insured is clearly invoked.
I conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the trial
court to justify its finding that the policy in issue covered
this loss.
It will be recalled that the trial court awarded plaintiffs
the sum of $1,309.15 together with court costs. Defendant
contends that even if it is liable under the policy, it is liable
only to the extent of $1,000 under the" each accident" clause.
'l'he policy, under the heading "Conditions" sets forth, in
paragraph 6, "LIMITS OF LrABir~ITY, Coverage D. 'f he limit of
property damage liability stated in the declarations as 'aggregate operations' is the total limit of the company's liability for
all damages arising out of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of premises or operations rated upon
a remuneration premium basis or by contractors' equipment
rated on a receipts premium basis . . . .
''The limit of property damage liability stated in the declarations as 'aggregate contractual' is the total limit of the
company's liability for all damages arising out of injury to
or destruction of property, including the loss of usc thereof,
with respect to each contract.
"These limits apply separately to each project with respect
to operations being performed away from premises owned or
rented by the named insured.''
Paragraph 5 provides ''LIMITS OJ;" LIABILITY-PRODUCTs,
Coverages B and D. 'rhc limits of bodily injury liability and
property damage liability stated in the declarations as 'aggregate products' are respectively the total limits of the company's liability for all damages arising out of the products
hazard. All sueh damages arising out of one prepared or
acquired lot of goods or products shall be considered as arising out of one aceident." "Products Hazard" (3(f)) as defined by the policy is quoted snpra.
The trial court found that by the terms of the contract of
insurance defendant agreed to pay on behalf of plaintiffs all
sums which they should beeome legally obligated to pay because of loss caused to property including the loss of use
thereof ''by reason of the handling or use of, the existence of
any condition in, or a warranty of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the insured plain-
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tiffs.
'' Under the unquestionably ambiguous provisions
heretofore quoted, it cannot be said that the finding is unsupported by the record. An insurance policy is to be construed
most favorably to the insured, in such a manner as to provide
full coverage of the indicated risk rather than to narrow the
protection (Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46
Cal.2d 423, 437-438 [296 P.2d 801, 57 A.L.R.2d 914] ; Ritchie
v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal.App.2d 245, 257 [286 P.2d
1000]; Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal.2d 626,
634 [107 P.2d 252, 131 A.L.R. 1292]). If the insurer would
create an exception to the general import of the principal
coverage clauses, the burden rests upon it to phrase that
exception in clear and unmistakable language. (Pendell v.
Westland Life Ins. Co., 95 Cal.App.2d 766, 770 [214 P.2d
392] .)
In view of the foregoing it would seem that if, as stated by
Mr. Justice Traynor in Bollinger v. National F1:re Ins. Co.,
25 Cal.2d 399, 405 [154 P.2d 399], "that the primary function of insurance is to insure,'' the judgment here should be
affirmed.

